TWN, INC., a Utah corporation v. Uwe Michel, and indivudal, and Ullrich Michel, an individual : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation v. Uwe Michel,
and indivudal, and Ullrich Michel, an individual :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vincent C Rampton, Ross I Romero; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Bruce J Nelson; Jeffrey S Williams; Nelson, Christensen and Helsten; Richard M Hymas; Nielsen &
Senior; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, TWN v. Michel, No. 20041121 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5453
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal No. 20041121-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE FRED HOWARD 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee TWN, Inc. 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Jeffrey S. Williams 
Nelson, Christensen & Helsten 
68 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Richard M. Hymas 
Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400 
5217 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 2 2 2005 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal No. 20041121-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE FRED HOWARD 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Jeffrey S. Williams 
Nelson, Christensen & Helsten 
68 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee TWN, Inc. 
Richard M. Hymas 
Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400 
5217 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
Cases iii 
Rules iii 
Other Authorities iii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 4 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE TWN FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE 4 
A. The Affidavit Was Not Prepared When The Matters Referred 
To Therein Were "Fresh" In Mr. Christenson's Memory, 
Notwithstanding His Conclusory Statement To The Contrary 4 
B. The Michels' Attorney Timely Objected To TWN's Request That 
Mr. Christenson Be Permitted To Read The Affidavit Into Evidence . . . . 7 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling That Mr. Christenson Signed The 1985 Deed 
To Zions Only As Trustee Of The Cape Trust Is Contrary To The Clear 
Weight Of The Evidence And Is Clearly Erroneous 9 
D. Had TWN Submitted The Affidavit With Its Summary Judgment 
Motion Prior To The First Appeal, The Affidavit Would Not Have 
Entitled TWN to Summary Judgment 12 
II. THIS COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM ADDRESSING THE 
MICHELS' RES JUDICATA DEFENSE ON APPEAL, AND SHOULD 
RULE THAT TWN'S CLAIM IS BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
CLAIM PRECLUSION . ! 14 
A. The Michels Preserved Their Claim Preclusion Defense In The First 
Appeal 14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. TWN Is In Privity With Mr. Christenson For Purposes Of 
Res Judicata 15 
C. TWN'S Claim Of Ownership Of The Property Could Have And 
Should Have Been Presented In The SLC Lawsuit. And Therefore 
TWN's Claim In This Action Is Barred By Res Judicata 19 
III. FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN SECTION IV OF THE MICHELS' 
INITIAL BRIEF, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE 
MICHELS' TAX SALE DEFENSE, RULE THAT IT IS NOT BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARE THE TAX SALE 
INVALID AND THE TAX DEED VOID AB INITIO, AND REVERSE 
THE JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT NEITHER MR. 
CHRISTENSON NOR TWN EVER ACQUIRED A VALID INTEREST 
IN THE PROPERTY 19 
CONCLUSION 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d 668 
(Utah 1982) 12 
Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985) 6 
Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168 (1973) 16 
Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1996) 17 
Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1980) 13 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, 70 P.3d 904 14 
Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1997) 15 
TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70; 66 P.3d 1031 12,15 
U.S. v. FMC Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1106 (E.D.Pa. 1969) 5, 6 
U.S. v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975) 5 
Rules 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) 4 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) 13 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(5) 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
Other Authorities 
18 Moore's Federal Practice (3d Ed.) at § 131.40[3][b][i] 16 
18 Moore's Federal Practice (3d Ed.) at § 131.40[3][b][ii] 16 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982) 16, 17, 18 
-iii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For the recorded recollection exception under U.R.E. 803(5) to apply, it must be 
shown that the writing was made when the matter was "fresh" in the witness' memory. 
While some courts require the writing to be made at or near the time the recorded events 
occurred, and others are not quite so restrictive, no court has applied the recorded 
recollection exception where the writing was made more than three years after the events 
took place. Where Mr. Christenson's Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the 
1985 Deed to Zions described therein was executed, it was not prepared when the 
recorded events were fresh in his memory as a matter of law. Mr. Christenson's 
conclusory statement to the contrary does not produce a different result. The trial court 
erred in allowing the Affidavit to be read into evidence under the recorded recollection 
exception. 
The Michels' attorney timely objected at trial to the reading of the Affidavit under 
Rule 803(5) on the ground that the Affidavit was not made when the recorded events 
were fresh in Mr. Christenson's memory. That objection was not waived simply because 
the decision was not restated a second time. 
Mr. Christenson's testimony that it was not his habit to sign a document as trustee 
if he was not acting on behalf of a trust does not mean that he did not do so on occasion, 
and constitutes insufficient evidence to render the trial court's ruling not clearly 
erroneous. Such testimony provides no credible evidence regarding his intent when he 
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signed the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" after his signature, and does not 
rebut the presumption of descripto personae in this case. 
The overwhelming evidence established that Mr. Christenson did not intend to 
convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as trustee of the Cape Trust. Mr. 
Christenson purchased the Property at tax sale to protect Zions' interest in the Property. 
When Zions repaid Mr. Christenson for the amount he paid to purchase the Property, he 
reconveyed the Property to Zions. Mr. Christenson held no interest in the Property as 
trustee of the Cape Trust at the time the 1985 Deed to Zions was signed. After the deed 
was recorded, the County Recorder showed the title to the Property to be vested in Zions, 
not Mr. Christenson. One year later, Mr. Christenson's company purchased the Property 
from Zions, took out a loan to do so, and gave Zions a trust deed to the Property to secure 
the loan. Mr. Christenson did not list the Property as an asset on his 1987 Financial 
Statement. When his company defaulted on its loan to Zions, the Property was sold to the 
Michels at foreclosure sale. In the SLC Lawsuit filed in 1996, Mr. Christenson did not 
claim to be the owner of the Property; and the district court in the SLC Lawsuit ultimately 
held that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the Property. In view of the 
foregoing evidence, the trial court's ruling in this action was against the clear weight of 
the evidence and was clearly erroneous. 
The Affidavit consisted of unsubstantiated opinions, conclusions or beliefs, lacked 
evidentiary foundation, and failed to state admissible facts. Had it been submitted with 
TWN's motion for summary judgment prior to the first appeal, TWN would not have 
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been entitled to summary judgment. A genuine issue would have remained regarding 
Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" after 
his signature. 
The Court is warranted in considering the Michels' claim preclusion defense 
because that defense, which arose after the entry of the summary judgment that was the 
subject of the earlier appeal, was specifically raised in the Michels5 docketing statement, 
and the decision in the SLC Lawsuit was noted and discussed in their brief, in the first 
appeal. The Court also may consider the claim preclusion defense to prevent manifest 
injustice. 
Under the general rule, TWN is in privity with Mr. Christenson under the claim 
preclusion doctrine because Mr. Christenson transferred any interest he had in the 
Property to TWN while the SLC Lawsuit was pending. The exceptions to the general rule 
found in § 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments have not been adopted in Utah, 
and therefore do not apply. Even if those exceptions were recognized in Utah, TWN still 
would be in privity with Mr. Christenson, and bound by the rules of res judicata, where 
TWN did not present evidence establishing the applicability of the exceptions. 
Where Mr. Christenson's claim in the SLC Lawsuit and TWN's claim in this 
action both sought a determination of the parties' respective right, title and interest in the 
Property, TWN's claim could have and should have been asserted in the SLC Lawsuit. 
Because that claim was not raised in that action, TWN, as successor-in-interest to Mr. 
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Christenson, is barred under the claim preclusion doctrine from asserting the claim in this 
action. 
For the reasons set forth in Section IV of the Michels' initial brief, the Court 
should determine that the Michels' invalid tax sale defense has not been waived and 
should consider it on appeal, rule that this defense is not barred by the statute of 
limitations, declare that the 1984 Tax Sale is invalid and that the Tax Deed is void ab 
initio, and reverse the Judgment on the ground that neither Mr. Christenson nor TWN 
ever acquired a valid interest in the Property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE TWN FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE 
A. The Affidavit Was Not Prepared When The Matters Referred To Therein 
Were "Fresh" In Mr. Christenson's Memory, Notwithstanding His 
Conclusory Statement To The Contrary. 
TWN argues in its brief that the "foundational question [in determining whether a 
writing may be read into evidence under Rule 803(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
["Rule 803(5)"] is not the lapse of time between the events recorded in the writing and 
the writing's creation, but whether, at the time the writing was created, the substance 
thereof was clear in the witness's memory." [TWN Brief at 24.] That statement is 
inaccurate. 
Rule 803(5), as well as the case law interpreting the recorded recollection 
exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5), requires that the writing be made when 
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the matter is "fresh" in the witness' memory, not simply when it is "clear" in the witness' 
memory, as TWN contends. U.R.E. 803(5).! Requiring the matter to be "fresh" in the 
witness' memory helps to insure the trustworthiness of the writing. See U.S. v. FMC 
Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1106, 1137 (E.D.Pa. 1969). TWN's interpretation of Rule 803(5) so 
as to eliminate the requirement that the writing be made when the matter is "fresh" in the 
witness' memory is not supported by the case law and cannot be sustained. 
TWN argues that even though Mr. Christenson's Affidavit was prepared fourteen 
years after the 1985 Deed to Zions was executed, his intention in signing the deed still 
was "fresh" in his memory within the meaning of the recorded recollection exception 
because the modern rule does not require that the recorded recollection be "made at or 
near the time of the events recorded," but rather considers the question on a case-by-case 
basis. While some courts no longer require the recorded recollection to be "made at or 
near the time of the events recorded," TWN has presented no court decision or other legal 
authority suggesting that the recorded recollection exception will apply where the writing 
was made fourteen years after the events referred to therein occurred. 
In U.S. v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1976), the court sustained the 
reading into evidence of a writing that was made three years after the events referred to 
therein took place. The Michels are not aware of any other reported decision that has 
permitted a record made more than three years after the recorded events occurred to be 
read into evidence under the recorded recollection exception. To the contrary, courts 
]Utah Rule of Evidence 803(5) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5). 
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have refused to treat records as being made when "fresh" in the witness' memory where 
the records were made more than three years after the events took place. See Cathey v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1582-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (where events 
occurred "several years prior to preparing the l i s t . . . the freshness requirement of Rule 
803(5) would not seem to be met"); U.S. v. FMC Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1106, 1136-38 (E.D. 
Pa. 1969) (events occurring four to eight years before recorded statement was made were 
too remote). Based upon the applicable case law, an event cannot be considered "fresh" 
in a person's memory fourteen years after the event occurred. 
In attempting to justify the trial court's action in allowing the Affidavit to be read 
into evidence under the recorded recollection exception, TWN relies upon the conclusory 
statement made by Mr. Christenson at trial that the contents of the Affidavit were fresh in 
his recollection at the time he signed the Affidavit.2 Where fourteen years had elapsed 
between the signing of the 1985 Deed to Zions and the signing of the Affidavit, the 
Affidavit was not signed when the events described therein were "fresh" in Mr. 
Christenson's memory as a matter of law, notwithstanding Mr. Christenson's conclusory 
testimony to the contrary. 
TWN erroneously argues that the Michels seek to impose new legal standards 
restricting the trial court's discretion in admitting the content of the Affidavit under Rule 
803(5). To the contrary, the Michels simply object to the trial court allowing the 
2Mr. Christenson merely adopted the conclusory statement contained in the question 
posed to him by TWN's counsel, as follows: "Q. 'At the time you signed that [affidavit], 
were the contents of the affidavit fresh in your recollection?' A. 'Yes.'" [R. 1379 at 20.] 
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Affidavit to be read into evidence when it was not prepared when the matters referred to 
therein were fresh in the witness' memory, as Rule 803(5) requires. Given that the 
Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the 1985 Deed to Zions was executed by Mr. 
Christenson, long after that event was fresh in Mr. Christenson's memory, the trial court 
committed reversible error in allowing that Affidavit to be read into evidence at trial. 
B. The Michels' Attorney Timely Objected To TWN's Request That Mr, 
Christenson Be Permitted To Read The Affidavit Into Evidence. 
TWN argues that the Michels' attorney only objected to the reading of the 
Affidavit on the basis that the Affidavit was not being used to refresh the witness' 
recollection.3 That argument is factually incorrect and without merit. 
TWN's attorney asked the trial court for permission for Mr. Christenson to read 
the Affidavit into evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception set forth in 
Rule 803(5). [R. 1379 at 18.] The Michels' attorney objected, arguing that, under Rule 
803(5), TWN had to show that the Affidavit "was made or adopted by the witness when 
the matter was fresh in the witness' memory," and that the Affidavit "certainly wasn't 
made at or about the time it was fresh in his mind." [R. 1379 at 18.] Following further 
discussion between the trial court and counsel and voir dire of the witness, TWN renewed 
its request that the witness be allowed to read the entire Affidavit into evidence, which 
the trial court granted. [R. at 19-25.] 
3Contrary to TWN's assertion, the Michels do not claim that the recorded recollection 
exception did not apply because the Affidavit did not refresh Mr. Christenson's present 
recollection regarding his intent when he signed the 1985 Deed to Zions. 
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TWN states that after the trial court initially sustained the Michels' attorney's 
objection to the reading of the Affidavit, TWN's counsel "backed up and tried again," 
eliciting from the witness "foundational testimony which directly tracked the 
requirements of Rule 803(5)." [TWN's Brief at 25.] TWN argues that because the 
Michels' attorney did not renew his objection a second time, but merely conducted voir 
dire of the witness on the issue of whether the Affidavit refreshed the witness' 
recollection of the events contained therein, the objection was waived. 
TWN's argument ignores the fact that the basis for the Michels' attorney's 
objection to the witness being permitted to read into the record the contents of the 
Affidavit - that the Affidavit had not been made when the events set forth therein were 
fresh in the witness' memory - was not an objection based on lack of foundation that 
could be cured by eliciting additional foundational testimony. The objection was that, 
because the Affidavit was made fourteen years after the events described therein 
occurred, the Affidavit was not made when the events were fresh in the witness' memory. 
TWN's counsel could not and did not overcome the objection to the reading of the 
Affidavit into evidence by eliciting additional testimony from the witness. Mr. 
Christenson's subsequent testimony did not change the fact that the Affidavit still was 
prepared fourteen years after the events described therein had occurred, thereby making 
the reading of the Affidavit improper under Rule 803(5). The Michels' attorney had 
objected to the reading of the Affidavit on the ground that the Affidavit had not been 
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prepared when the recorded events were fresh in the witness' memory, and that objection 
was not waived simply because it was not repeated a second time. 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling That Mr, Christenson Signed The 1985 Deed To 
Zions Only As Trustee Of The Cape Trust Is Contrary To The Clear Weight 
Of The Evidence And Is Clearly Erroneous. 
TWN asserts that Mr. Christenson testified "that, as a matter of business practice, 
he would not have executed a Quitclaim Deed with the word 'Trustee' after his name, if 
he intended to convey his individual interest" and argues that such testimony "was 
sufficient, standing alone, to render the trial court's ruling not 'clearly erroneous,' and 
subject to attack." [TWN Brief at 30-31.] TWN is wrong on both counts. 
The testimony of Mr. Christenson relied upon by TWN was as follows: 
Q. (by Mr. Rampton) Do you make it a habit as your business activity 
to sign a document stating that your signature is on behalf of- is as 
trustee if you're not acting on behalf of the trust? 
A. No. We try to be very specific as to what trust I'm conveying 
(inaudible) signing it. 
Q. Would it be unusual for you to try to convey an individual interest on 
a document that says "Trustee" on it? 
A. You wouldn't put "Trustee" in it if you were signing (inaudible). 
[R. 1379 at 39.] 
Mr. Christenson's vague, imprecise and, to some extent, non-responsive answers 
to TWN's counsel's leading questions on this subject do not constitute sufficient evidence 
to render the trial court's ruling not clearly erroneous, as TWN suggests. Even if Mr. 
Christenson did not "make it a habit" to sign a document with the word "trustee" after his 
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name if he was not acting on behalf of a trust, that does not mean that he never did so. 
Even if such an occurrence were unusual, it still may have happened on occasion. 
Mr. Christenson's testimony did not provide any credible evidence regarding his 
intent when signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" after his signature. 
Mr. Christenson was unable to recall why the word "Trustee" was next to his signature on 
that deed. He was unable to testify whether the word "trustee" was on the deed for a 
purpose, for no purpose, or as a result of a mistake. He presented no testimony or any 
other evidence regarding his intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions that would rebut the 
presumption of descriptio personae. 
This is particularly true given the overwhelming evidence establishing that Mr. 
Christenson did not intend to convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as trustee 
of the Cape Trust. The evidence presented at trial established: 
1. Mr. Christenson, as a customer of Zions, purchased the Property at the Tax 
Sale in order to protect Zions' interest in the Property. [R. 1380 at 8-9.] 
2. Zions reimbursed Mr. Christenson for the full amount that he had paid to 
purchase the Property at the Tax Sale, whereupon Mr. Christenson conveyed the Property 
to Zions by executing the 1985 Deed to Zions. [R. at 1380 at 10-12.] 
3. There is no evidence that Mr. Christenson held any interest in the Property 
as trustee of the Cape Trust at the time the 1985 Deed to Zions was signed. 
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4. After the 1985 Deed to Zions was recorded, the Utah County Recorder's 
office showed that title to the property was vested in Zions, not Mr. Christenson. [R. 
1380 at 91; Ex. 12 at U 7.] 
5. One year later, Mr. Christenson caused his company, Franklin, to purchase 
the Property from Zions for a large sum of money, and took out a loan from Zions to do 
so. [R. 1380 at 16, 20-21.] 
6. After Franklin purchased the Property from Zions, Mr. Christenson signed a 
Trust Deed to the Property on behalf of Franklin, pledging the Property to secure the loan, 
thereby acknowledging that Franklin was the owner of the Property. [Ex. 6; R. 1380 at 
20-21.] 
7. Mr. Christenson did not list the Property as an asset owned by him on his 
1987 Financial Statement. [Ex. 10.] 
8. When Mr. Christenson5s company failed to make payment on the loan to 
Zions, the Property was sold to the Michels at foreclosure sale. [R. 1380 at 22.] 
9. In 1996, Mr. Christenson filed the SLC Lawsuit against the Michels and 
others to foreclose what he claimed was a beneficial interest in a contract right in the 
Property. [Ex. 8 at 22.] He did not claim that he was the owner of the Property at that 
time. The court in the SLC Lawsuit ultimately held that Mr. Christenson had no right, 
title or interest in the Property. [Ex. 9 at 4, % 1.] 
The overwhelming evidence establishes that Mr. Christenson, in signing the 1985 
Deed to Zions, understood that he was conveying his entire interest in the Property, and 
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did not intend to convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as trustee for Cape 
Tmst. The trial court's decision was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, and was 
clearly erroneous, and therefore the Judgment in favor of TWN should be reversed. 
D. Had TWN Submitted The Affidavit With Its Summary Judgment Motion 
Prior To The First Appeal The Affidavit Would Not Have Entitled TWN to 
Summary Judgment. 
TWN argues that if it had submitted Mr. Christenson's Affidavit to the trial court 
in support of its motion for summary judgment, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment would have been sustained on appeal, and there would have been no trial on 
remand. In making this argument, TWN relies upon this Court's statement in TWN I that 
the Supreme Court in Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d 
668, 669 (Utah 1982), was "suggesting that a counter-affidavit could have rebutted the 
presumption of descriptio personae and shown that the descriptive language was intended 
to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than in his individual capacity." 
[TWNI at f 14.] Based upon this language, TWN asserts that the Affidavit would have 
constituted the needed evidence to establish that the inclusion of the word "trustee" on the 
1985 Deed to Zions reflected Mr. Christenson's intention to convey to Zions only his 
interest in the Property as trustee for the Cape Trust, and not his personal interest in the 
Property. That argument is without merit. 
First of all, the Affidavit was not submitted with the summary judgment motion, 
and TWN's speculation as to what might have resulted had the Affidavit been filed with 
the motion does not support the judgment entered following the trial on remand. 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, TWN's argument ignores the fact that an affidavit supporting or 
opposing a motion for summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, must set 
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must affirmatively show that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. See U.R.C.P. 56(e). An 
affidavit that reflects merely the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions, conclusions or beliefs, 
lacks evidentiary foundation, or fails to state admissible facts must be stricken. See 
Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1380 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980). Mr. 
Christenson's Affidavit contains only a conclusory and self-serving statement that he 
intended to sign the 1985 Deed to Zions in his capacity as trustee of Cape Trust. The 
Affidavit fails to provide any evidentiary foundation or other admissible facts to support 
that statement. 
Had the Affidavit been submitted at trial, the Michels would have presented the 
evidence outlined above that establishes that Mr. Christenson understood that he was 
conveying to Zions his individual interest in the Property, and did not intend to convey 
only his interest in the Property as trustee for Cape Trust. Such evidence refuting the 
assertions in the Affidavit would have created a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "trustee" 
following his signature, thereby precluding the granting of summary judgment.4 
4Based upon the conclusory nature of the Affidavit, and the overwhelming evidence 
refuting the statement in the Affidavit regarding Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 
1985 Deed to Zions, the Court also is justified in summarily rejecting TWN's suggestion 
that this Court now should rule that the Affidavit cures the deficiency in the record before 
it in 2003, and should sustain the trial court's earlier grant of summary judgment. 
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II. THIS COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM ADDRESSING 
THE MICHELS' RES JUDICATA DEFENSE ON APPEAL, 
AND SHOULD RULE THAT TWN'S CLAIM IS BARRED 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION 
A. The Michels Preserved Their Claim Preclusion Defense In The First Appeal. 
The Michels raised their claim preclusion defense promptly after the district 
court's Summary Judgment Order in the SLC Lawsuit was entered, as part of their motion 
for reconsideration of the trial court's decision granting TWN's motion for summary 
judgment. The parties briefed the issue, but the trial court, in denying the motion for 
reconsideration, did not address the claim preclusion defense. Since the trial court did not 
specifically address or rule on the claim preclusion defense prior to the first appeal, the 
trial court was not precluded from considering the issue on remand pursuant to the "law 
of the case" doctrine. See generally Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 
2003 UT 23, % 25, 70 P.3d 904, 912. 
While the Michels did not expressly identify the claim preclusion defense as a 
specific issue to be decided in the first appeal, they certainly raised the issue as part of 
their appeal. The Michels notified the Court in their docketing statement of the decision 
in the SLC Lawsuit, and that the Michels had argued to the trial court that some or all of 
the issues in the case were barred by res judicata. [R. 1162 at 7.] The decision in the 
SLC Lawsuit also was noted in the Michels' brief in the first appeal, and a copy of that 
decision was attached thereto. [See Addendum F to the Michels' Initial Brief at 8, f 28, 
19 n.10, Addendum E thereto.] 
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This Court did not address the claim preclusion defense in TWN I, but may do so 
now in this appeal to prevent manifest injustice. See Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 
1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1997). The trial court's ruling that TWN, as the successor to Mr. 
Christenson, is the rightful owner of the Property is inconsistent with the district court's 
decision in the SLC Lawsuit that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the 
Property. Where this issue was not decided in the trial court prior to the first appeal, was 
not decided in TWN I, and was not decided by the trial court on remand, and has been 
raised and briefed by the parties, the Court is warranted in considering and ruling on the 
claim preclusion defense. 
B. TWN Is In Privity With Mr, Christenson For Purposes Of Res Judicata, 
TWN argues that the Michels' claim preclusion defense does not bar TWN's 
action against the Michels because TWN was not in privity with Mr. Christenson for 
claim preclusion purposes. Although it is undisputed that TWN acquired its claimed 
interest in the Property from Mr. Christenson [see Ex. 3], TWN asserts that there is no 
privity for claim preclusion purposes because it acquired the Property from Mr. 
Christenson before the judgment in the SLC Lawsuit was entered, TWN was not made a 
party to the SLC Lawsuit, and a lis pendens was not filed in the SLC Lawsuit. [TWN 
Brief at 33-34.] TWN's reliance on those facts in support of its argument on the privity 
issue is misplaced. 
In support of its position, TWN summarizes generally the commentary in Moore's 
Federal Practice ["Moore"] regarding the circumstances in which a successor-in-interest 
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to property may be in privity with the transferor. [TWN's Brief at 33-34.] TWN's 
reliance on that language in Moore also is misplaced. 
Moore specifically provides in relevant part as follows: 
A transferee of property following a judgment affecting that property 
[which was the subject of the litigation] may benefit from and is subject to 
application of claim preclusion to the same extent as the transferor of the 
property would be. . . . Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, the rights 
"conveyed" to the prevailing party would include the entire claim relating to 
those interests, so a successor in interest could not relitigate such interests 
by utilizing a different legal theory or seeking different relief. 
18 Moore's Federal Practice (3d Ed.) at § 131.40[3][b][i], pp. 131-138, 131-139. 
With respect to transfers of property made while litigation is pending, Moore 
states: 
If the property is the subject of a pending action at the time of 
transfer, the result is the same as a transfer following judgment, unless 
statutes requiring notice of pending actions relating to certain property have 
not been complied with or the opposing party is aware of the transfer and 
knows that the successor in interest is unaware of the pending action. 
18 Moore's Fed. Prac. (3dEd.)at§ 131.40[3][b][ii],p. 131-139, citing Golden State 
Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168 (1973) ("Persons acquiring an interest in 
property that is a subject of litigation are bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, a 
subsequent judgment, despite a lack of knowledge"), and Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments §44 (1982). 
Moore's statements regarding the impact of the claim preclusion doctrine on a 
successor-in-interest to whom property was transferred during the pendency of an action 
involving the transferor is based upon the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 
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(1982), although Moore's summary of that section is incomplete. Section 44 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments states in pertinent part as follows: 
A successor in interest of property that is the subject of a pending 
action to which his transferor is a party is bound by and entitled to the 
benefits of the rules of res judicata to the same extent as his transferor, 
unless: 
(1) A procedure exists for notifying potential successors in 
interest of pending actions concerning property, the procedure was not 
followed, and the successor did not otherwise have knowledge of the 
action; or 
(2) The opposing party in the action knew of the transfer to the 
successor and knew also that the successor was unaware of the pending 
action. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982) (emphasis added). 
Under this section of the Restatement, as recognized in Moore, the general rule is 
that the transferee of property that is the subject of a pending action in which the 
transferor is a party is bound by the rules of res judicata to the same extent as the 
transferor. Accordingly, TWN, as the successor-in-interest of Mr. Christenson in the 
Property, is in privity with him, and is bound by the rules of res judicata. 
TWN argues that it is not in privity with Mr. Christenson for claim preclusion 
purposes, and is not bound by the rules of res judicata, because of the two exceptions to 
the general rule contained in § 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. However, 
this Court has specifically refused to adopt these exceptions to the general rule. In Kunz 
& Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah App. 1996), this Court stated: 
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Kunz proposes that we adopt the test set forth in the Second 
Restatement of Judgments, which provides various exceptions to the 
applicability of res judicata to a successor of a property interest when that 
property is the subject of a pending litigation to which the transferor of the 
interest, rather than the successor, is a party. See Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 44 (1982). Utah has not adopted the Restatement test, and we 
decline to do so now. [Emphasis added.] 
Mr. Christenson filed the SLC Lawsuit in 1996 to foreclose a claimed interest in 
the Property. [R. 1380 at 23; Ex. 8 at 2, f 3.] In 1998, while the SLC Lawsuit was 
pending, Mr. Christenson transferred whatever interest he had in the Property to TWN by 
quit-claim deed. [Ex. 3.] In 2000, the district court in the SLC Lawsuit entered its 
Summary Judgment Order, ruling that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the 
Property. [Ex. 9 at 4, f 1.] Where TWN acquired the Property from Mr. Christenson 
during the pendency of the SLC Lawsuit, and where the exceptions set forth in § 44 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments do not apply, TWN is in privity with Mr. Christenson 
under the claim preclusion doctrine. 
Even if the exceptions contained in § 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
applied in Utah, TWN still would be in privity with Mr. Christenson and bound by the 
rules of res judicata because TWN did not present evidence establishing that those 
exceptions apply in this case. TWN did not prove that it was without knowledge of the 
pendency of the SLC Lawsuit at the time Mr. Christenson conveyed his interest in the 
Property to TWN in 1998, thereby rendering exception (1) inapplicable, or that the 
Michels knew that TWN was unaware of the SLC Lawsuit, thereby precluding the 
application of exception (2). 
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C. TWN's Claim Of Ownership Of The Property Could Have And Should Have 
Been Presented In The SLC Lawsuit And Therefore TWN's Claim In This 
Action Is Barred By Res Judicata. 
In the SLC Lawsuit, Mr. Christenson alleged that his interest in the Property was 
superior to that of the Michels and all other defendants, and he sought to foreclose their 
interests in the Property. In this action, TWN claims that it is the owner of the Property, 
which it obtained from Mr. Christenson, and that the Michels have no interest in the 
Property. Where both claims seek a determination of the parties' respective right, title 
and interest in the Property, the claim being asserted by TWN in this action could have 
and should have been asserted by Mr. Christenson in the SLC Lawsuit. Where Mr. 
Christenson failed to do so, TWN, the successor-in-interest to Mr. Christenson, is barred 
under the claim preclusion doctrine from asserting its claim in this action. 
III. FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN SECTION IV OF THE MICHELS 
INITIAL BRIEF, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE 
MICHELS' TAX SALE DEFENSE, RULE THAT IT IS NOT 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARE THE 
SALE INVALID AND THE TAX DEED VOID AB INITIO, AND 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT NEITHER 
MR. CHRISTENSON NOR TWN EVER ACQUIRED 
A VALID INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
In their initial brief, the Michels presented the facts and law supporting their 
position that they did not waive their right to challenge the validity of the 1984 Tax Sale, 
that this issue was not disposed of by this Court in the first appeal, that the tax sale 
defense is not barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Court is warranted in 
declaring the Tax Sale invalid and the Tax Deed void ab initio. The points raised in the 
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Michels' initial brief fully address the arguments made by TWN in its brief on appeal, and 
therefore no reply to those arguments is necessary. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Section IV of the Michels' initial brief, 
the Court should consider their tax sale defense on appeal, rule that this defense is not 
barred by the statute of limitations, declare the Tax Sale is invalid and the Tax Deed is 
void ab initio, and reverse the Judgment entered by the trial court on the ground that 
neither Mr. Christenson nor TWN ever acquired any valid interest in the Property. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief and in the Michels' initial Brief, the 
Michels respectfully request that the Court reverse the Judgment entered by the trial court, 
and enter judgment in favor of the Michels, quieting title to the Property in them. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2005. 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
and 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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